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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this article is to develop new international financial integration indicators together with 
their determinants: financial openness and regularity (balance) of the bilateral financial flows. The 
study's contribution is based on the definition of the Standard of Perfect Financial Integration 
(SPFI). This standard characterizes the scenario attainable when financial flows are not 
geographically biased, and cross-border asset trade is not affected by home bias. We assess the gap 
between a hypothetical scenario of geographic neutrality and the current level of financial 
integration, along with both of its components. The empirical application to the banking systems of 
18 countries —accounting for 83% of international banking markets— over the 1999-2006 period 
enables us to conclude that the level of financial integration has advanced rapidly over the last few 
years, and is close to 50% as of 2006, i.e., we are halfway to the SPFI. However, notable 
differences among countries are both persistent and growing, and the integration level achieved for 
each banking system differs when either assessed from the financial inflows or outflows 
perspective. 
 
Keywords: Banking Integration, Financial Globalization, Geographic Neutrality, Network Analysis 
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RESUMEN 
 
El objetivo de este artículo es desarrollar nuevos indicadores de integración financiera internacional 
junto con sus determinantes: apertura y regularidad (equilibrio) de los flujos financieros bilaterales. 
La contribución del estudio se basa en la definición del Standard de Integración Financiera Perfecta 
(SIFP). Este standard caracteriza el escenario alcanzable cuando los flujos financieros no están 
sesgados geográficamente, y el comercio de activos financieros no se ve influenciado por el sesgo 
doméstico. El estudio mide también la distancia entre el escenario hipotético de neutralidad 
geográfica y el nivel de integración financiera actual, junto con sus dos componentes. La aplicación 
empírica se centra en los sistemas bancarios de 18 países, que suponen el 83% de los mercados 
financieros internacionales, entre 1999 y 2006, y los resultados permiten concluir que el nivel de 
integración financiera ha avanzado rápidamente durante los últimos años, y está cercano al 50% en 
2006, esto es, hemos recorrido la mitad del camino que nos separa del SIFP. Sin embargo, existen 
importantes diferencias entre países que son persistentes y crecientes, y el nivel de integración 
alcanzado para cada sistema bancario difiere cuando se valora desde la perspectiva de las entradas o 
salidas de capitales. 
 
Palabras clave: integración bancaria, globalización financiera, neutralidad geográfica, análisis de 
redes 
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1. Introduction 
It is generally agreed that international integration is rapidly advancing in many 
economic activities, in particular finance. Capital markets are notable examples of the 
growing global interdependency, also evident in banking systems. At a regional level, it is 
also clear that monetary and financial integration acts as a starting point in the advance of 
economic and social integration processes. In the case of Europe, the monetary union and 
the plans to encourage the integration of financial services (Financial Services Action Plan, 
FSAP) are considered important leverages for construction of the European Union financial 
(European Central Bank, 2007). 
The advantages of an integrated financial market are associated with the hypothesis 
that participants follow a single set of rules, have identical access, and are treated equally 
(Baele et al., 2004; European Central Bank, 2007; García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007). 
Expected results of integration would be price convergence between different geographic 
markets and increasing cross-border allocation of investment. Cross-border integration can 
proceed gradually, either globally or regionally, because geographical proximity is still an 
important determinant of trade and financial flows (Berger et al., 2000; Portes et al., 2001; 
Portes and Rey, 2005). However, the development of remote access technologies in 
financial activities has taken off and, in cooperation with integration policies, makes it 
possible to bypass the traditional requirement of geographical proximity between suppliers 
of services and their customers. 
Under these circumstances, the evaluation of financial and banking integration has 
received a great deal of attention1. Most of the results indicate that the convergence of 
interest rates and the increase in the proportion of cross-border activities confirm the 
advance of financial integration. However, it is necessary to evaluate the integration level 
achieved, as well as its trend. Regarding this, the current scenario is ambiguous, as the 
results hinge crucially on the indicators used. The results are often carried out without using 
                                        
 
1 See the reviews by Adam et al. (2002), Cabral et al. (2002), Adjouté and Danthine (2003), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2003), Baele et al. (2004), Dermine (2006), among others. On the premise that integration is 
advancing, literature has focused especially on the study of: a) the determinants of the degree of financial 
integration (Vo and Daly, 2007; Papaioannou, 2008); b) the consequences of integration, in particular on 
growth (Guiso et al., 2004); and c) the relationship between financial and commercial integration (Aviat and 
Coeurdacier, 2007). 
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precise criteria on the maximum value attainable by integration, and are therefore 
unsatisfactory. 
With the aim of improving the available indicators of financial integration, this 
study develops three new indices, focusing on quantities. Following a suggestion by 
Frankel (2000), we shall call the central reference the Standard of Perfect Financial 
Integration (SPFI). This standard corresponds to the state achieved when financial cross-
border assets and liabilities show no geographical bias, and are not influenced by distance 
or barriers between countries2 but only by the size of the financial systems. The SPFI does 
not have a normative value. That is, it solely represents a benchmark —which perhaps is 
currently unavailable— that not only requires countries to be more financially open, but 
also to obtain a full and geographically unbiased development of the network of 
connections linking economies. Thus, the most important contributions of the study are 
that, developing the SPFI, we can measure the gap between the current level of 
international financial integration and the scenario of complete financial globalization, so as 
to evaluate the evolution of the level of international financial integration, as a starting 
point to analyze their determinants. 
Previous initiatives to measure financial integration based on prices are preferred by 
many scholars when considering an axiomatic criterion —the compliance with the law of 
one price (LOOP)— in different geographical markets. The literature on financial 
integration based on the LOOP has grown rapidly over the last few years, owing to the 
existing data on prices3. However, the key problem of this approach is the lack of a 
benchmark to measure integration in the absence of perfect competition conditions, which 
is the most common situation in the case of banking markets. A unique price would only 
exist for homogeneous financial products, and not for others that can be differentiated. In 
this sense, convergence of interest rates is to be expected in markets, such as interbank and 
government bonds. However, this is not the case in retail banking markets, which offer 
differentiated products for different investments and clients, in particular loans, credits and 
deposits. 
                                        
 
2  Frankel (2000) indicates the need to define a Standard of Perfect International Integration, describing the 
conditions under which world trade web would operate as a global village. 
3 See Cabral et al. (2002), Baele et al. (2004), Flood and Rose (2005), Kleimeier and Sander (2006), or 
Vajanne, among others. 
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In addition, this literature considers that the existence of a unique price suffices for 
economic or financial integration. However, even if trade, capital and monetary barriers are 
lifted and price differentials vanish, economic integration may not arise naturally as we 
must also take into account other factors such as the incentives of economic agents to go 
abroad, the institutional conditions of both the source and destination countries —especially 
in terms of property rights and law enforcement— and the influence of regulation, which is 
crucial for banks (Pérez et al., 2005). 
The measures based on volume data are generally considered less satisfactory. As 
indicated by Manna (2004), this area of research has flourished comparatively less than the 
more established literature on prices/interest rates (see Dermine, 2002). Nevertheless, when 
thoroughly examined, quantity-based measures could contribute significantly to achieving a 
precise picture of integration. According to a recent state-of-the-art survey on economic 
globalization indicators (OECD, 2005), the current indicators are inordinately based on the 
old concept of market openness, which valuates the weight of external demand (export, 
import) in relation to national production (GDP). The objective of this is to understand 
whether a country and the rest of the world are given adequate attention in proportion to the 
importance of their economies. However, this approach has two important shortcomings. 
The first one is that if the GDP is the denominator of the indicator for measuring the 
degree of financial openness, its meaning might be misleading because two separate 
processes are being convoluted: openness, and intensification of financial activities. 
Banking openness to the exterior could be measured as the weight of external assets when 
considering the balance sheet, AAF/ , while financial intensity measures the proportion 
between the volume of financial activities and the real activity ( GDPA/ ). Given that 
)/)(/(=/ GDPAAAFGDPAF , and that the second term on the r.h.s. has grown remarkably 
over the last decade in many countries, the GDP-based indicators of financial openness 
might have actually grown strongly even if the weight of the foreign assets did not increase 
remarkably in the balance sheet ( AAF/ ). Therefore, although some available measures (see 
Pérez et al., 2005) consider GDP-based indicators as valid, we will not consider them 
because of the variety of meanings they may actually convey. 
A further constraint when measuring the advance of international integration using 
the degree of openness, is that international integration is not only a question of increasing 
the openness of countries but also of developing a network of direct and indirect relations 
between economies. From the globalization perspective, the limitation of the degree of 
openness is that it completely disregards the architecture of financial trade connections that 
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each country has with the rest of the world. In our objective to develop indexes of financial 
integration which take into account this complexity, two issues emerge as most relevant in 
the wide range of literature, and both are related to the geographic orientation of flows. 
First, the rationale for the biases observed in flows, at home or bilateral level; second, the 
analysis of the network of connections between countries. 
At the beginning of the XXI century, several studies considered that, despite the 
forces that represent drastic reduction in global barriers to competition in the financial 
services industry (abolition of barriers, deregulation, improvements in information 
processing and telecommunications) the financial services industry, and retail banking in 
particular, currently remain far from globalized. The evidence suggests that borders 
continue to play an important role in the geographic orientation of financial flows, and that 
home bias is very relevant in the allocation of resources, as suggested by the equity home 
bias literature (see, for instance Levy and Sarnat, 1970) . In particular, many banking 
services remain local, probably as a consequence of competitive advantages that the 
superior information of banks about local and non financial suppliers and customers 
represents (Berger et al.,  2000, 2003; Berger, 2003). As found by Manna (2004), the share 
of cross-border banking activity is remarkably lower for the four largest euro-area countries 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) than for the other countries. This factor indicates that 
geographical proximity and common language are still providing rationale for a home bias 
in banking retail products, whereas the effect is less pronounced in the wholesale segments, 
especially interbank markets. 
The literature on gravity equations represents the most widely used empirical 
approach to explain the rationale for geographic biases in trade flows. The gravity equation 
relates international flows to different types of distance, and to the economic dimension 
(GDP's) of the source and destination countries. The success of the gravity model 
explaining data, increases interest by giving the gravity equation a structural interpretation 
in different ways. Adopting the gravity equation framework to describe the international 
asset flows is much more recent. The seminal paper by Portes and Rey (2005) merges 
elements of financial literature on portfolio composition, and international economics and 
asset trade literature. In their analysis, cross-border asset flows depend on market size in 
both source and destination country, as well as on trading costs, in which both information 
and transaction technology play a role. From this perspective, distance may also be 
important in the financial cross-border activities because it may be regarded as a proxy for 
information costs, and should enable the modest decline observed in home or regional 
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biases of flows to be explained. Thus, the geography of information emerges as a main 
determinant of the pattern of international financial transactions4. 
However, when geographic barriers disappear —because the importance of frontiers 
diminishes, and the cost of transport or information falls—, the effect of relative distance 
slowdowns and the shares of different countries in the financial inflows/outflows of a 
country ought to be closer to the GDP's shares. In an extreme scenario of eradication of 
every possibility of remoteness (Scholte, 2002), only the economic dimension of partners 
will matter. 
The literature analyzing regionalism (and its effects on the intensity of intra-
regional and extra-regional trade) also considers the problem of prioritizing some 
connections over others vs. no-country, or no-regional, preference situation. The concept of 
geographic neutrality (Summers, 1991; Krugman, 1991, 1996) may be defined as the 
absence of preferential directions in flows. That is, the geographic distribution of a 
country's trade is said to be neutral if the weight of every partner in the country's trade is 
equal to its weight in the world trade5. Following a similar approximation in the financial 
area, Manna (2004) develops eight statistical indicators of the integration of the euro area 
banking system, two of which estimate home bias and the distance of the actual distribution 
of cross-border positions from the distribution prevailing under the assumption of no-
country preference. 
The situations of no-geographic preferences in flows will be an important reference 
to our analysis of the level of financial integration. They can be considered equivalent to 
the so-called “zero gravity” scenario (see, for instance Eaton and Kortum, 2002), because 
distance does not matter and/or remoteness does not exit. In these scenarios, economies 
would be perfectly integrated through a complex network of connections, in which 
financial flows would be the vectors of a graph in which the nodes represent the countries, 
so it would be possible to analyze the degree of connectedness in the network. Although 
these techniques are somewhat underused by economists in comparison with other social 
                                        
 
4 Some recent studies have used gravity equations to describe financial flows; see, for instance, Buch and 
Lipponer (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), Papaioannou (2008), Buch (2005), or Aviat and 
Coeurdacier (2007). 
5 See also the cited literature in Gaulier et al. (2004), for a discussion on the measures of regional trade 
intensity and their limitations. 
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sciences, this approach is not new in international economics6, and has attracted recent 
interest7. 
Our analysis of financial integration shares two characteristics with the network 
analysis approach. First it pays attention to the number of connections and the way they are 
distributed. Second, we judge as important not only first-order relationships (direct links) 
but also higher order relationships (indirect links), since assets might cross several 
economies before reaching their final destination. Our integration index considers these 
aspects to define the SPFI, and to measure how far/close financial systems, or the global 
financial system as a whole, are to this scenario. 
On the basis of these premises, the rest of the study develops indicators of financial 
integration which take into account the degree of financial openness, as well as the 
regularity of the connections between countries' financial systems. The paper is structured 
as follows. In section 2, we define the Standard of Perfect Financial Integration (SPFI), and 
characterize the indicators of the degree of financial openness, the degree of financial 
regularity, and the degree of financial integration for each country and for the global 
financial markets as a whole. In section 3 we present the data used to apply our 
methodology to the case of banking systems, using available data on bilateral exchange of 
assets between a set of 18 countries, which represents 83% of the world financial assets in 
2006. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the empirical evidence obtained on the integration of the 
banking systems, and section 6. 
2. Integration indicators: definitions and properties 
The integration of international financial markets starts with the cross-border 
financial flows (foreign assets and liabilities). However, its effects and scope also depend 
on the structure of current relations between financial markets8. Relevant aspects of this 
                                        
 
6 Several studies highlight the importance of information flowing through cultural, political or economic ties 
(Rauch, 2001; Rauch and Casella, 2003; Pandey and Whalley, 2004; Combes et al., 2005). For recent banking 
applications, see McGuire and Tarashev (2006), or von Peter (2007). 
7 Other studies suggest applying complex network analysis concepts, topological properties and instruments 
from different sciences developed to study the structure and dynamics of international trade, using 
instruments such as centrality, network density, clustering, assortative mixing or maximum flow. See, for 
instance Kali and Reyes (2005). 
8 Although we perform an application to cross-border banking activity, we will refer to financial/banking 
assets and liabilities interchangeably, in order to ease the readability and understanding of this section. 
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structure include the number of countries each country is in contact with, and whether the 
relationships are direct or indirect (i.e., whether cross-border financial flows cross third 
economies). In addition, the volume of cross-border financial activity between them is also 
important, as well as the proportionality of this activity to the size of the financial markets. 
If we consider financial globalization as synonymous of the highest possible level 
of financial integration, the flow from one country to another would only depend on their 
relative size because barriers to financial trade are lifted and there is no home bias effect. 
As suggested by the literature on home equity bias, investors should be able to exploit the 
benefits of international asset diversification, and not concentrate their investments in the 
assets of their home country (see, for instance Strong and Xu, 2003). Considering this 
global scenario, we will define the Standard Perfect Financial Integration (SPFI) as an 
extension of the concept of geographic neutrality (Krugman, 1996; Summers, 1991), and as 
a hypothetical benchmark that will not necessarily be reached if distance and other factors 
matter. Cross-country financial integration does not necessarily imply financial 
globalization according to the geographic neutrality criterion. A country whose cross-
border financial flows are lower than those corresponding to the size of its total financial 
assets is as far from being integrated as another country whose financial flows are above 
that proportion. Both countries show an unbalanced situation, given that home (internal) 
financial flows and cross-border financial flows are not in accordance with the geographic 
neutrality criterion. Therefore, geographic neutrality implies that the proportion of home 
and foreign assets held by domestic investors should be proportional to the relative sizes of 
each financial system. The absence of geographic neutrality would be equivalent to the 
equity home bias effect (Lewis, 1999), where individuals hold too little of their wealth in 
foreign assets. However, the geographic neutrality concept is far more general, since 
deviations from equilibrium are explained away only by differences in the relative size of 
the financial systems. 
Under the neutrality assumption, a balanced value for the cross-country financial 
activity exists, and the following property must be verified: 
Home neutrality (P1): A country whose home financial assets are proportional to 
its share of the world financial market will have a higher level of financial integration. 
Not only the total cross-border financial activity a country has is important, but also 
its distribution. In a global financial village, when there are no transaction (informational) 
costs or regional preferences, the distribution of the financial activity of a country between 
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the destination countries should be characterized by their relative size. Under geographic 
neutrality, a country has no preferences of any kind (social, political, geographical, etc.) for 
the direction of its financial cross-border flows, and they are only determined by the size of 
the recipient financial systems, as stated by the following property (P2). 
Direct international neutrality (P2): a country that balances its direct financial 
relationships with other individual countries, in proportion to the size of their financial 
systems, will have a higher level of financial integration. 
Financial flows between countries reflect only first-order relationships. However, 
higher-orders may also be relevant. The set of relationships established between countries 
operates like roads between cities. First, they allow countries to be connected even when 
there is no direct relationship between them. Second, there are different ways in which 
flows can reach their final destination, depending on the intermediating countries they 
cross. Goods, services, and capital may move from one country to another several times 
before arriving at its final destination. This possibility enables the interconnectivity of the 
world to increase, and therefore its integration. 
Indirect international neutrality (P3): a country that reinforces its financial links 
with other countries through balanced indirect relationships which cross intermediating 
countries will have a higher level of financial integration. 
A country can deviate from perfect financial integration due to some of the factors 
mentioned above. The impact of this deviation on financial globalization will depend on the 
size of every financial system. When a large economy departs from perfect integration, it 
reduces financial globalization to a larger extent than a small economy. For example, the 
influence of Germany on financial globalization is necessarily higher than, for instance, the 
influence of Greece. Thus, the integration index should also be weighted by the size of the 
financial systems. 
Size (P4): the larger the financial market of a country, the more relevant its 
integration will be to the globalization of the world financial market system (global level of 
financial integration). 
We say that the world achieves the SPFI if properties P1 to P4 are verified at the 
highest level, making this scenario an extension of the concept of geographic neutrality. 
Given its wider coverage, we name it geographic superneutrality. 
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In order to answer the question of how much countries meet the four properties 
above, we must define an integration index and assess the distance that sets the current 
level of integration apart from the SPFI. We will proceed in four stages, each one defining 
different indicators, which correspond to the next four subsections. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the four indicators is conducted on two levels. The individual level focuses on 
each country, and the global level corresponds to the analysis of all economies. On the 
second level, the weight of each financial system enters the aggregation analysis and allows 
us to define our Integration Index. 
Let us start with some definitions. Let },{1,= gN …  be the set of countries and let 
i  and j  be typical members of this set. Let g  be the number of countries in N , i.e., the 
number of economies in the analysis. Given a measurable relationship between economies, 
we define the flow ijX  as the intensity of this relationship from economy i  to economy j . 
In each year and for each balance-sheet indicator, we avail of a gg ×  matrix of data. To 
keep the presentation simple we omit the time index, unless this might generate confusion. 
The financial market activity between countries can be evaluated through either the cross-
country flows of assets or liabilities. Moreover, in general the flow will be asymmetric, so 
that ijX  will not necessarily be equal to jiX , for all Nji ∈, ; and also assume that iiX  
measures the home assets or liabilities for all countries Ni∈ . 
Let ijNji XX ∑ ∈=  be the size of the financial system of country Ni∈ . We define ia  
as the country i 's relative weight with respect to the world economy, i.e., jNjii XXa ∑ ∈/= . 
2.1. Degree of financial openness 
In the first stage we characterize the degree of financial openness. We start with the 
usual definition but corrected for home bias to take into account the differing sizes of the 
financial systems of the countries being compared. Thus, we are taking into account that 
domestic investors hold a proportion of home assets, and that its volume will vary 
depending on the size of each particular financial system9. In order to control for home 
bias, we define iXˆ  as the foreign claims of country i  (i.e., assets held abroad by banks of 
                                        
 
9 As documented by the literature on home equity bias, the proportion of domestic assets held by domestic 
investors is too big relative to the predictions of the standard portfolio theory (see Lewis, 1999). We consider 
that it should be proportional to the size of the home financial system. 
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country i , in case we considered data on bank flows) taking into account the weight in the 
world financial system of the country under analysis, namely, iiii XaXX −=ˆ . We then 
define the relative flow (cross-border banking assets or liabilities) or degree of financial 
openness between countries i  and j  as iijij XXDFO ˆ/= . 
Definition 1 Given a country Ni∈ , we define its degree of financial openness, iDFO , as  
 \
\
= = .ˆ
ij
j N i
i ij
j N i i
X
DFO DFO
X
∈
∈
∑
∑  (1) 
By definition the degree of financial openness takes the value of 1 if and only if 
home neutrality is verified (P1). The degree of financial openness yields nonnegative 
results, where a value lower than 1 indicates that its cross-border bank flows are lower than 
the corresponding ones, given the country's share of the world banking assets. In the 
unlikely instances of values higher than 1, it would indicate that country i 's cross-border 
bank flows are higher than those it should have given the country's share of the world 
banking assets. 
Differences in DFO  among countries can be attributed to different barriers to 
financial integration (lack of information, regulations, political or cultural factors, 
economic riskiness, etc.). However, differences in the measure of financial openness cannot 
be caused by the bias due to country size, since we have corrected for home bias10. 
2.2. Degree of regularity of direct financial connections 
In this second stage we analyze whether the connection of one country with others 
is proportional to the differing financial systems' sizes, or whether this connection does not 
show geographical neutrality. The latter instance would contribute to widen the gap 
between the current level of financial integration and the scenario corresponding to a 
financially globalized world according to the direct international neutrality property (P2). 
Thus, we define the degree of regularity of direct financial connections to measure the 
                                        
 
10 We write DFO  instead of iDFO  when general statements on the degree of financial openness are being 
made, or references to the variable itself, which do not hang on any specific country. The same rule will be 
applied to the other indicators. 
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discrepancy between the cross-border financial flows in the real world and those 
corresponding to the SPFI. 
In the financial network, the relative flow from country i  to country j  in terms of 
the total financial flows of country i , ijα , is given by  
 
ij
iNj
ij
ij X
X
∑
∈ \
=α  (2) 
where ji ≠  and 0=iiα  (recall that 0≠iiX ). Let )(= ijA α  be the square matrix of relative 
flows: the component ij  of matrix A  is ijα . 
We consider that the global financial system is perfectly connected if the financial 
flows between two countries are proportional to the relative size of their financial systems. 
A country that is part of a perfectly connected world financial system will hold assets in 
other countries in proportion to the size of the destination countries. 
On the other hand, if the world economy is perfectly connected, then the flow from 
country i  to country j  should be equal to iij Xˆβ , where 
 
k
iNk
j
ij X
X
∑
∈ \
=β  (3) 
is the relative weight of country j  in a world where country i  is not considered. 
Note that 1=
\ ijiNj
β∑ ∈  and that ijβ  is the degree of financial openness between 
countries i  and j  in the perfectly connected world, with 0=iiβ . Let )(= ijB β  be the 
square matrix of degrees of openness in the perfectly balanced connected world. 
Starting from the previously defined matrices, we can define an indicator that 
measures the distance between the real distribution of financial flows and that 
corresponding to a perfectly balanced connected world. We consider the cosine of the angle 
of the vector of relative flows with the vector of the flows in a perfectly connected world. 
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Definition 2 Given an economy Ni∈  we define the degree of regularity of direct 
financial connections of i , iDRDFC , as  
 ( ) ( ) .= 22 ij
Nj
ij
Nj
ijij
Nj
iDRDFC βα
βα
∑∑
∑
∈∈
∈  (4) 
Although the cosine of two vectors ranges between 1−  and 1, the degree of direct 
financial connections always takes nonnegative values given that both vectors have only 
nonnegative components. DRDFC  measures whether financial systems meet P2, providing 
a single value that equals 1 if and only if a country meets the property of direct 
international neutrality, and approaches zero for a country whose cross-border financial 
flows are directed towards the smallest financial systems. 
2.3. Degree of regularity of total financial connections 
In the third stage, we consider the indirect relationships between countries along 
with their importance. In order to extend the analysis of financial market integration in this 
direction, we define the degree of regularity of total financial connections, which evaluates 
the importance of all direct and indirect relationships that countries establish with each 
other. 
Both the real world matrix A  and the perfectly connected world matrix B  consider 
direct relative flows between countries. However, part of the flow from country i  to 
country j  may cross third countries, and those indirect flows also contribute to integration. 
Let AAAA
n
n ⋅⋅⋅ …=  be the n -times product matrix of matrix A  and let nijα  be the 
element ij  of nA . It is not difficult to show that nijα  is the relative flow that goes from i  to 
j  crossing 1−n  intermediate countries. Moreover, it is verified that 10 ≤≤ nijα  for all 
1≥n . In the same way we define nB , the elements of which evaluate the flow passing 
through all countries in a perfectly connected world. 
Let (0,1)∈iγ  be the proportion of flow that country i  receives from another 
country and remains invested in the first one, while iγ−1  is the proportion of received flow 
that a country redirects to another country. For estimating iγ , an additional assumption is 
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needed. Let us assume that this proportion is equal to the proportion of financial flows of 
country i  that remain as home financial investment. If country i  verifies this assumption, 
then the following equality holds, 
 ii
F
ii
H
iii
F
i LLLX )(1=)(1)(1= γγγ −−+−  
where FiX  is the country i  assets issued from other countries and 
H
iL  are the home 
liabilities. Given that ii XL =  it implies that iijiNji XX /=1 \∑ ∈−γ  or equivalently  
 ./= iiii XXγ  (5) 
Therefore, under our assumption iγ  is the proportion of financial flows that are 
internally invested in country i . Of course, the procedure to estimate iγ  will hinge on the 
flow considered —either inflow or outflow. 
Let Γ  be the square diagonal matrix of direct flow proportions, so that the element 
ii  of Γ  is iγ  and the element ,ij  for ,ji ≠  is zero. The matrix of total flows from one 
country to another is the sum of the direct and indirect flows and can be estimated as  
 1
=1
= ( ) ,n n
n
A I A
∞
Γ −Γ −Γ∑  (6) 
 1
=1
= ( )n n
n
B I B
∞
Γ −Γ −Γ∑  (7) 
where I  is the identity matrix of order g . Both expressions depend on matrix Γ . 
Let Γijα  be the element ij  of the matrix ΓA  and Γijβ  be the element ij  of the matrix 
ΓB . Each element of these matrices is the weighted sum of the direct and indirect flows 
through any possible number of intermediate economies. We can verify that the above two 
series are convergent. 
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Definition 3 Given an economy Ni∈  we define the degree of regularity of total financial 
connections of i , DRTFC Γi , as  
 ( ) ( ) .= 22 Γ
∈
Γ
∈
ΓΓ
∈Γ
∑∑
∑
ij
Nj
ij
Nj
ijij
Nj
iDRTFC βα
βα
 (8) 
The degree of financial regularity of total connections ranges in the (0,1)  interval. 
It measures the distance of the direct and indirect financial flows of a country from what its 
financial flows would be in a perfectly connected world financial system. Similarly to the 
degree of financial regularity of direct connections, it should equal 1 when the financial 
flows of a country are proportional to the size of the recipient countries (indirect 
international neutrality). It should be close to zero if the largest countries do not receive any 
financial inflows and the smallest receive all of them. 
We should bear in mind that if there are no indirect flows, i.e., 1=iγ  for all 
countries, then expressions (6) and (7) yield AA =Γ  and BB =Γ . Thus, the degrees of 
regularity of total connections and regularity of direct connections coincide. The limit case 
0=iγ  (financial products and services go through an infinite number of transformations 
before reaching their final destinations) cannot be derived directly from the above 
expressions. The basic limit theorem of Markov chains11 is needed to show that when 0=γ  
the proportion of flow a country j  receives from a country i  is independent of i , i.e., all 
countries send the same proportion of flow to economy j . 
2.4. Degree of financial integration 
From the concepts above we define the degree of financial integration, which 
combines degrees of financial openness and financial regularity of total connection, 
provided that both set limits to the financial integration level achieved. 
                                        
 
11 By definition we verify that 1== ijNjijNj βα ∑∑ ∈∈ , thus both matrices A  and B  define Markov 
chains and it can be proved that they are recurrent irreducible aperiodic Markov chains. 
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Definition 4 Given an economy Ni∈  we define its degree of financial integration, ΓiDFI , 
as  
 ΓΓ iiii DRTFCDFODFODFI },{1/min=  (9) 
The degree of financial integration of a given country is the geometric average of its 
deviation from the balanced degree of financial openness and financial regularity of total 
connections. Therefore, DFI  depends on both the openness of the banking system and the 
balance in its direct and indirect flows with other financial systems. Moreover, if and only 
if the financial system verifies properties P1 to P4, then DFI  will be equal 1. 
If ΓΓ iiii DRTFCDFODFODFI },1/{min= , then 
 Γ
Γ
Γ
i
i
i
ii
DFI
DRTFC
DFI
DFODFO },1/{min=1  (10) 
and we can interpret each of these two factors as the weight that the degrees of openness 
and regularity of total connections have over the degree of integration. In a given economy, 
this can be useful to analyze changes over time in the weight of the factors. 
2.5. Other global indicators 
In the previous subsections we have defined several indicators that characterize the 
integration of each individual country and that, as the degree of financial integration, can 
also be summarized for the whole economy: 
Degree of global financial openness:  
 .= ii
Ni
DFOaDGFO ∑
∈
 (11) 
Degree of regularity of global direct financial connections:  
 .= ii
Ni
DRDFCaDRGDFC ∑
∈
 (12) 
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Degree of regularity of global total financial connections: 
 .= Γ
∈
Γ ∑ ii
Ni
DRTFCaDRGTFC  (13) 
To characterize the integration of the whole economy, we should consider the share 
of each economy in the world (property 4) to define the global indicator as follows (recall 
that jNjii XXa ∑ ∈/= ), 
Definition 5 We define the degree of financial integration (globalization) of the whole 
economy as  
 .= Γ
∈
Γ ∑ ii
Ni
DFIaDGFI  (14) 
The DGFI  indicator is the most general quantitative approximation to the 
international financial market integration of countries, as it considers not only the degree of 
financial openness, but also the distribution of the direct and indirect flows between 
countries, and the size of a country's financial system. In light of the different concepts 
included in this definition, the indicator will be considered as a Globalization Index for the 
world financial system, according to properties P1 to P4. The first three properties are an 
increasing function of DGFI  for any country. Property P4 is verified because DGFI  is a 
weighted average of the countries' degree of integration, where the weight of each country 
depends directly on its size. The degree of financial integration measures how close the 
world is to the SPFI, which should be equal to 1 when all countries are perfectly integrated 
and achieve their theoretical potential of integration in a world without any remoteness. 
3. Data 
Our data set contains information on both total assets of the different banking 
industries under analysis, and bank foreign claims for both financial outflows and inflows. 
That is, assets held abroad by banks of a given country (outflows), and bank assets of a 
given country owned by foreign banks (inflows). The data on bilateral banking financial 
assets are provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)12, which issues quarterly 
                                        
 
12 See http://www.bis.org/statistics/histstats10.htm. 
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the international claims of its reporting banks on individual countries, geographically 
broken down by nationality of the reporting banks. Our data contains information on the 
largest world economies, and also on some specific countries with large banking systems 
such as Switzerland, to the total of 18 countries. The data on total assets are provided by the 
European Central Bank for European Union countries, and by the central bank of each 
country, with some exceptions. 
Our data set is also crucially determined by the available information, which was 
incomplete in terms of countries and sample years. Finally, only eighteen countries and 
eight years (1999-2006) were selected to perform the analysis. Stretching the sample period 
in both dimensions, i.e., countries selected and length of the period, led inevitably to 
incomplete data sets and difficulties for drawing conclusions on the dynamics of financial 
globalization. Furthermore, even if some additional countries for which information was 
available for some years were included in the sample13, the gains in terms of total bank 
assets were not substantial, as the constrained sample accounted for more than 90% of the 
enlarged sample. Our data also refers to flows from consolidated banks, constituting a clear 
advantage to avoid double counting compared to using unconsolidated balance sheet data, 
which is the usual approach followed by many other studies on banking integration. 
Table 1 provides information on these matters. As shown by columns five and six, it 
is quite apparent that the U.S. financial system is far less “bancarized” than large European 
countries such as Germany, Italy, France, or Spain. As of 2006, the share of the U.S. 
banking system was quite small (14.84%), especially taking into account the size of the 
U.S. economy. As also indicated in table 1, the total assets of the U.S. banking system in 
terms of GDP are well below those of the other countries in the sample. 
Cross-border claims have also been increasing sharply for all countries and, as 
documented by some authors, today they are over 30 times larger in absolute terms than 
thirty years ago (McGuire and Tarashev, 2006). This information is reported in columns 
seven through twelve. For all countries there has been a sharp increase in foreign claims 
from 1999 to 2006, not only in absolute terms (columns 11-12) but also as a % or GDP 
(columns 7-8)  or  as  a  %  of  total  assets  (columns  9-10).  Finally, columns 13-16 report
                                        
 
13 Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Taiwan. 
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Table 1. Data by country, 1999 and 2006 
Total bank assets1 
Shares of the 
international 
banking markets 
Total assets as % of 
GDP 
Total consolidated 
foreign claims as % 
of GDP 
Total consolidated 
foreign claims as  
% of total assets 
Total consolidated 
foreign claims1 
Total consolidated 
foreign claims of 
the sample 
countries as % of 
their total foreign 
claims 
Total consolidated 
foreign claims of 
the sample 
countries as % of 
total assets 
Country 
1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 
Austria   488,939   1,040,167   1.38   1.58   229.43   322.59   47.61   126.03   20.75   39.07   67,261   166,090   66.30   40.87   13.76   15.97  
Belgium   718,791   1,480,967   2.03   2.25   283.19   377.80   151.66   283.46   53.55   75.03   318,891   944,370   82.84   84.99   44.36   63.77  
Canada   1,120,339   2,285,461   3.17   3.48   172.04   182.62   44.85   50.19   26.07   27.48   250,845   528,463   85.89   84.14   22.39   23.12  
Denmark   356,402   826,978   1.01   1.26   204.89   300.46   28.75   82.79   14.03   27.56   32,263   180,512   64.52   79.22   9.05   21.83  
Finland   120,251   357,434   0.34   0.54   93.31   170.66   24.27   46.97   26.01   27.52   24,845   71,053   79.45   72.22   20.66   19.88  
France   3,643,785   8,126,944   10.30   12.36   250.28   364.32   57.66   117.21   23.04   32.17   662,008   2,145,308   78.86   82.05   18.17   26.40  
Germany   5,704,621   9,422,345   16.13   14.34   266.12   324.16   80.59   121.85   30.28   37.59   1,333,868   2,816,268   77.21   79.51   23.38   29.89  
Greece   181,933   422,757   0.51   0.64   148.27   172.59   NA   25.36   NA   14.69   NA   16,996   NA   27.36   NA   4.02  
Ireland   304,193   1,915,181   0.86   2.91   315.10   860.18   77.97   280.96   24.74   32.66   69,435   544,569   92.25   87.05   22.83   28.43  
Italy   1,649,453   3,780,317   4.66   5.75   137.36   204.92   21.53   22.85   15.67   11.15   198,396   271,784   76.74   64.47   12.03   7.19  
Japan   7,517,125   6,300,049   21.25   9.59   172.90   145.16   23.62   42.72   13.66   29.43   762,596   1,339,054   74.27   72.21   10.14   21.25  
Netherlands   988,225   2,466,873   2.79   3.75   237.78   375.14   97.29   317.11   40.91   84.53   312,146   1,872,767   77.20   89.81   31.59   75.92  
Portugal   250,547   524,034   0.71   0.80   205.94   272.12   37.12   64.14   18.03   23.57   30,082   89,103   66.60   72.13   12.01   17.00  
Spain   1,048,501   3,313,309   2.96   5.04   169.68   270.70   41.30   80.73   24.34   29.82   194,915   898,526   76.37   90.93   18.59   27.12  
Sweden   477,890   1,103,376   1.35   1.68   188.35   286.65   35.70   157.71   18.95   55.02   69,596   429,547   76.84   70.76   14.56   38.93  
Switzerland   1,402,756   2,617,552   3.97   3.98   529.59   689.27   363.78   648.41   68.69   94.07   886,789   2,114,966   92.03   85.89   63.22   80.80  
United 
Kingdom   3,802,069   9,992,567   10.75   15.20   259.55   426.12   59.14   132.04   22.78   30.99   565,207   2,253,219   65.25   72.77   14.87   22.55  
United States   5,596,500   9,750,600   15.82   14.84   60.72   73.86   7.36   10.10   12.12   13.68   468,448   921,173   69.04   69.07   8.37   9.45  
1 In millions current US$. 
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information on the representativeness of our sample, which varies depending on the country 
but is generally quite high. 
The analysis performed in the ensuing sections will focus on both directions of 
foreign claims. That is, not only on bank assets held abroad by banks of a given country 
(cross-border bank outflows) but also on bank assets of each country owned by foreign 
banks (cross-border bank inflows). We will refer to each direction using the out  and in  
superscripts, in order to refer to outflows and inflows, respectively. Table 1 contains 
information on outflows only, so as to save space and also because the information on total 
consolidated foreign claims of the sample countries either as a percentage of their total 
foreign claims or their total assets (i.e., the information reported by columns 13-16) is not 
available for inflows. 
4. Empirical evidence: the integration of the international banking 
systems 
4.1. Degree of financial openness 
Table 2 shows the results of the degree of financial openness for years 1999 and 
2006 —i.e., the initial and final sample years. The first two columns refer to assets held 
abroad by banks of each country listed, whereas columns three and four refer to bank assets 
of a given country owned by foreign banks. Results vary a great deal in several dimensions. 
Looking at country differences, we notice that the most open financial systems in terms of 
assets held abroad as of 2006 are those of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium, 
indicating that the assets held abroad by banks from these countries represent the 85.2%, 
75.8%, and 66.0% of their total assets. These are important international financial centers, 
and therefore have large external portfolios (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). Although 
these are small countries, we must take into account that when dividing by total assets we 
control for home bias. That is, the fact that the share of cross-border activity is markedly 
lower for the largest country (Manna, 2004), and therefore countries with the largest 
banking markets could have also high degrees of financial openness. In contrast, the Greek, 
Italian and U.S. banking markets are far less internationalized, as shown by degrees of 
financial openness of 4.0%, 8.0%, and 10.5% by 2006. Even if we control for home bias, 
the assets held abroad by banks in these countries are extremely low. 
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Table 2. Degree of financial openness ( DFO ) (%) 
 
out
iDFO  
in
iDFO  Country  
1999 2006 1999 2006 
Austria   13.77   16.17   16.90   18.22  
Belgium   45.47   66.02   25.38   28.56  
Canada   22.66   24.10   11.48   12.79  
Denmark   9.24   22.39   15.02   30.60  
Finland   20.42   20.02   30.29   44.88  
France   21.62   33.34   11.83   15.95  
Germany   32.03   39.75   11.45   16.05  
Greece   NA   3.96   24.33   44.62  
Ireland   23.10   30.17   35.15   34.11  
Italy   12.20   7.99   24.98   28.93  
Japan   15.29   24.53   8.20   11.01  
Netherlands   29.05   75.80   28.36   32.83  
Portugal   11.54   16.23   20.38   34.36  
Spain   14.00   22.99   15.07   25.12  
Sweden   14.76   39.79   16.60   18.72  
Switzerland   66.86   85.16   7.98   9.00  
United Kingdom   17.01   28.64   37.06   42.99  
United States   9.23   10.49   47.10   80.17  
Unweighted mean   21.01   31.53   21.53   29.38  
Standard deviation   0.15   0.23   0.11   0.17  
Coefficient of variation   0.73   0.72   0.51   0.58  
 
 
These results vary, not only across countries but also over time. Indeed, many 
countries show cross-border bank flows which have increased sharply. In some cases such 
as Denmark, the Netherlands, or Sweden they have more than doubled, while in others they 
have also been substantial but more moderate. Of special note is the case of some large 
European countries whose degrees of openness have increased a great deal. However, this 
is not entirely attributable to the effect of the euro, since some of the largest increases have 
taken place in countries which have not yet adopted the single currency (basically Denmark 
and the U.K.). 
These patterns vary when considering the international bank flows in the opposite 
direction, i.e., the bank assets of each country in the table owned by foreign banks. Results 
differ greatly, especially for the most extreme cases. Indeed, the correlation coefficient is 
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38.2%−  for year 2006, and this highly negative sign holds for all sample years. Some 
countries whose outDFO  was quite high, such as Switzerland, have now become much 
more closed. On the other hand, the U.S. is quite open in terms of bank assets in the U.S. 
held by foreign banks. Disparity in the results is the general tendency. Apart from the U.S. 
some countries have now become much more open —such as Finland, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, or the U.K. In contrast, others become less financially open— Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
These tendencies are summarized in figure 1, which contains information on 
different aspects of the distribution of the degrees of financial openness. The upper panels 
show the evolution of relevant summary statistics such as the mean —both weighted and 
unweighted. Both statistics show a tight upward trend, for both outDFO  and inDFO , which 
has increased by roughly 50%. It is also worth noting the similarities between the patterns 
found for both weighting schemes, suggesting that the enhanced internationalization has 
occurred regardless of the size of the banking markets in each country. 
The lower panels in figure 1 provide information on the entire distributions of the 
variable under analysis via violin plots14. Accordingly, each figure contains both the box 
plot and the density trace, which is plotted symmetrically to the left and right of the vertical 
box plot. In our case, we provide information for both initial and final years, and both 
outDFO  and inDFO . Both cases show a tendency in the distribution to become more 
spread, although asymmetrically. That is, some (very few) countries are becoming more 
open in both directions, but most of them remain in the lower tails of the distribution. 
However, violin plots do not offer information on the relative positions, or intra-
distribution mobility over time. We do not know —unless we examine data individually—
whether some countries are moving upwards in their financial openness rankings over time, 
leaving us with an apparently stable distribution. 
                                        
 
14 As indicated by Hintze and Nelson (1998), violin plots combine the box plot and the density trace into a 
single display that reveals structure found within the data. Therefore, it contains both the information 
provided by box plots (such as center, spread, asymmetry, and outliers), but also the distributional 
characteristics of data contained in nonparametric density estimation (Silverman, 1986). 
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Figure 1. Degree of financial openness (DFO), 1999-2006 
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4.2. Degree of regularity of financial connections 
As indicated in section 2, the DRTFC  indicates whether cross-border bank flows 
are balanced in terms of the banking systems size of both the sending and recipient 
countries. According to the geographic neutrality idea, cross-border asset holdings of each 
country's banks should be directed preferably towards France, Germany, Japan, U.K., or the 
U.S., whereas Denmark, Finland, Greece or Portugal should attract less cross-border flows 
(in absolute terms). 
 24
Table 3 reports information on individual degrees of regularity of financial 
connections ( DRTFC ), following the geographic neutrality idea. The information is split 
into eight columns following three criteria, namely, the direction of the flows ( outDRTFC  
and inDRTFC ), the relevance of indirect connections ( 1=γ  and country-specific iγ ), and 
also the initial and final years. As suggested by the first two columns in table 3, some of the 
countries with lower levels of outDRTFC , especially in 2006, are the Nordic countries in 
our sample —Denmark, Finland and Sweden. These are countries with strong economic 
and financial ties, suggesting that the incentives of economic agents to go abroad might be 
geographically biased by these already established links. The apparently low values of 
DRTFC  for these countries arise because they are small in terms of total assets. The only 
non-Nordic country with 60%<outDRTFC  as of 2006 is Canada, which shares a common 
characteristic with these three countries, namely, the existence of strong links with the 
neighbors (the U.S., in spite of the border effect; see McCallum, 1995). In this case, 
although the size of the U.S. banking markets is big, it might be attracting too much of 
Canada's cross-border bank asset holdings —i.e., the cross-border flows are not balanced. 
Should we control for the likely existence of indirect financial links —i.e., the 
instance in which the bank flows from country i  to country j  cross a third country k —, 
considering a country-specific iγ  parameter, results change variedly. In general, we can 
observe that indirect connection play a role, increasing the level of connection between 
financial systems. Since the parameter controlling for this effect is country-specific, the gap 
between 1=γDRTFC  and iDRTFC γγ =  also varies across countries to a great extent, and it is 
wider for those countries with lower iγ  values (see table 4, which contain data on the 
specific values of iγ ) such as Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland (year 2006). 
There are also some countries whose DRTFC  does not overhang for being either 
too high or too low, which is the case of Ireland. However, Ireland's DRTFC  exhibits the 
highest growth between 1999 and 2006, regardless of the γ  considered. This increase 
reflects the fact that their cross-border financial flows have become more balanced, in terms 
of number and size of Ireland's financial partners: whereas by 1999 the U.K. and the U.S. 
accounted for more than 85% of Ireland's foreign claims (54.9% and 31.5%, respectively), 
by  2006  some  of  its  largest  European  partners  account  for  higher shares of its foreign
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Table 3. Degree of regularity of total financial connections ( DRTFC ), % 
 
Outflows Inflows 
1=γ  iγγ =  1=γ  iγγ =  Country 
1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 
Austria   80.98   84.71   82.53   88.29   66.93   66.64   71.36   71.68  
Belgium   67.07   80.92   80.54   89.79   74.76   75.34   79.50   80.90  
Canada   55.92   54.87   62.10   61.78   93.36   87.78   94.18   89.68  
Denmark   58.67   59.64   62.20   67.86   74.78   42.92   78.16   55.56  
Finland   53.89   32.65   62.40   42.33   60.17   26.03   71.40   49.12  
France   90.50   86.72   90.59   88.77   82.69   85.45   83.35   85.99  
Germany   86.86   90.19   86.95   90.31   85.57   83.67   86.07   84.80  
Greece   NA   80.77   NA   81.41   83.07   67.18   86.23   79.51  
Ireland   55.01   77.80   61.94   84.16   76.05   83.66   83.01   87.26  
Italy   78.05   88.78   79.63   89.64   75.15   76.07   79.16   81.00  
Japan   73.82   71.56   75.69   76.44   87.65   80.37   87.97   81.93  
Netherlands   84.46   86.30   86.04   88.83   68.20   75.77   75.62   82.04  
Portugal   70.09   72.47   73.47   78.90   64.03   61.25   70.68   74.19  
Spain   76.41   70.79   78.85   76.29   77.73   81.58   79.99   84.20  
Sweden   61.33   56.16   65.51   72.05   76.69   61.40   79.89   67.75  
Switzerland   72.04   66.49   81.57   85.09   79.06   86.51   80.14   87.15  
United Kingdom   75.16   70.83   76.86   74.37   77.74   85.82   82.45   87.73  
United States   83.33   87.98   83.69   88.24   90.01   84.86   92.57   91.43  
Unweighted mean   71.98   73.31   75.92   79.14   77.42   72.91   81.21   79.00  
Standard deviation   0.12   0.15   0.10   0.12   0.09   0.17   0.07   0.12  
Coefficient of 
variation   0.16   0.21   0.13   0.16   0.11   0.23   0.08   0.15  
 
 
assets. Specifically, the U.K. and the U.S. have fallen in their relative importance (now 
representing only the 42.2% and 10.3% of Irish foreign claims), whereas Germany, Italy, 
Spain and France account for 15.6%, 9.6%, 5.3% and 4.9%, respectively. This implies that, 
as suggested by the definition of the degree of regularity of the financial connections, now 
Ireland's cross-border flows are more balanced —both in terms of countries and volumes. 
Explanations for this pattern may be manifold, such as the adoption of the euro, which 
might have constituted an incentive for Irish financial agents to go abroad and trade more 
intensely with countries sharing the same currency. 
 
 26
Table 4. Country-specific γ  values (%) 
 
out
iγ  iniγ  Country 
1999 2006 1999 2006 
Austria   86.61   84.33   83.56   82.35  
Belgium   56.36   36.92   75.64   72.72  
Canada   78.75   77.55   89.23   88.09  
Denmark   90.95   78.17   85.28   70.17  
Finland   79.72   80.20   69.91   55.60  
France   82.60   74.40   90.48   87.75  
Germany   77.47   70.83   91.95   88.22  
Greece   NA   96.09   75.92   55.95  
Ireland   77.29   71.57   65.45   67.85  
Italy   88.91   92.90   77.30   74.31  
Japan   90.52   79.95   94.92   91.00  
Netherlands   72.55   29.79   73.20   69.58  
Portugal   88.63   84.03   79.91   66.19  
Spain   86.82   79.27   85.81   77.35  
Sweden   85.63   61.54   83.85   81.91  
Switzerland   38.33   21.48   92.64   91.70  
United Kingdom   86.45   79.41   70.48   69.09  
United States   93.46   92.39   66.62   41.85  
Unweighted mean   80.06   71.71   80.68   73.98  
Standard deviation   0.14   0.21   0.09   0.14  
Coefficient of 
variation   0.17   0.30   0.12   0.19  
 
 
Results also vary if we reverse the direction of the flows and examine the assets of 
each country owned by foreign banks ( inDRTFC ). This information is contained in the last 
four columns of table 3, for both γ  schemes, and for both initial and final sample years. 
Results for 1=γ  suggest the Nordic countries are still at the bottom, i.e., they show 
geographic bias, regardless of the directions of their financial flows. However, Canada 
moves upwards in this ranking reaching the top, suggesting its financial links with the U.S. 
are asymmetric. In this case, both 1=γDRTFC  and iDRTFC γγ =  are high for Canada because 
of Canada's bank assets owned by foreign banks (mostly U.S. banks). That is, the cross-
border bank flows between Canada and its financial partners, are balanced: large countries 
own larger shares of Canadian bank assets. 
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Figure 2. Degree of regularity of total financial connections (DRTFC), outflows, 1999-
2006 
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Figures 2 and 3 are graphical counterparts to the results reported in table 3, 
displaying analogous information like that reported in figure 1 in the case of the degree of 
financial openness. In contrast to the DFO  case, the degrees of regularity of financial 
connections show a higher level yet rather fuzzy pattern —although it is difficult to uncover 
with only eight years. Figure 2 suggests the pattern is slightly increasing for the total 
connections (country-specific γ ), although it is rather unstable for the direct connections, 
with all three statistics in the upper panels sharing a this pattern. However, in both cases the 
values are much higher than those corresponding to the degree of financial openness, 
emerging  as  the  main  contributor  to financial integration. The lower panels display 1999
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Figure 3. Degree of regularity of total financial connections (DRTFC), inflows, 1999-2006 
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and 2006 violin plots for the variables under analysis. We corroborate that the values for 
most countries are high —at least higher than the DFO —, and that we cannot conclude 
any clear tendency exists as to the central values of the distribution, but that the variety of 
behaviors is increasing, as shown by probability mass becoming more spread. However, the 
direction of the spread is not “positive”. In other words, it is not that the distribution is 
shifting rightwards (or upwards, if looking at the violin plot) but it is shifting towards lower 
values of regularity, and this finding is common to both γ  schemes. Therefore, although 
the contribution of this indicator to the world financial integration is high, some countries 
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—those shifting the distribution leftwards— are jeopardizing the advance of international 
financial integration. 
Although this is a hypothesis that requires further testing, both distance and regional 
trade agreements might be playing a role. This finding has already been documented by 
Portes and Rey (2005) who found that distance, which proxies for information 
asymmetries, is a very large barrier to cross-border asset trade, and Aviat and Coeurdacier 
(2007). The latter, as we do, use data on cross-border bank asset holdings and find that a 
10% increase in bilateral trade raises bilateral asset holdings by 6% or 7%. Therefore, an 
increasing role of distance (cross-border financial activity is higher with neighbors, or 
between regional trade agreements' members) implies a decreasing role of geographic 
neutrality (only the size of the trading countries matters) and, ultimately, a declining 
contribution to international economic integration. 
4.3. Degree of financial integration 
The degree of financial integration results from combining financial openness and 
regularity of financial connections, following equation (8). Results are reported analogously 
to the DFO  and DRTFC  cases. Table 5 provides results arrayed in eight columns which 
split the information according to three criteria, namely, the direction of the flows, the 
existence of indirect connections, and the initial and final years. The first four columns 
provide results for the assets held abroad by banks of each listed country. Since outDFI  
combines outDFO  and DRTFC , its tendencies can be explained via the evolution of its 
components. Disparities among countries were more pronounced in the case of the degree 
of financial openness, whereas the DRTFC  values were more homogeneous. Thus, 
differences among countries are mainly determined by the degree of financial openness 
and, as such, those countries more financially integrated are Belgium, the Netherlands, or 
Switzerland. Of special note is the case of Sweden, whose DRTFC  ranges amongst the 
lowest, whereas its high degree of financial openness pushes it upwards in the ranking 
ranging among the few countries with financial integration degrees above 50% as of 2006. 
However, although the more financially integrated countries in the world are small, 
large countries have also participated in this process: both Germany and France have 
50%>outDFI  by 2006, and Japan, the U.K. or Spain also go beyond the 40% line. 
Although some large countries still remain below these levels, if we extend the analysis to 
the cross-border bank flows flowing in the opposite direction, both Italy and particularly the
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Table 5. Degree of integration ( DFI ), % 
Outflows Inflows 
1=γ  iγγ =  1=γ  iγγ =  Country 
1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 1999 2006 
Austria  33.39 37.02 33.71 37.79 33.63 34.84 34.73 36.14 
Belgium  55.22 73.09 60.52 76.99 43.56 46.38 44.92 48.07 
Canada  35.60 36.36 37.51 38.59 32.74 33.50 32.89 33.86 
Denmark  23.28 36.54 23.97 38.98 33.52 36.24 34.27 41.23 
Finland  33.17 25.57 35.69 29.11 42.69 34.18 46.51 46.95 
France  44.24 53.77 44.26 54.40 31.28 36.92 31.40 37.04 
Germany  52.75 59.87 52.77 59.91 31.30 36.65 31.39 36.89 
Greece  NA 17.89 NA 17.96 44.96 54.75 45.81 59.56 
Ireland  35.65 48.45 37.83 50.39 51.70 53.42 54.02 54.56 
Italy  30.86 26.63 31.18 26.76 43.33 46.91 44.47 48.40 
Japan  33.60 41.90 34.02 43.30 26.80 29.74 26.85 30.03 
Netherlands  49.53 80.88 49.99 82.05 43.98 49.88 46.31 51.90 
Portugal  28.44 34.29 29.12 35.78 36.12 45.87 37.95 50.49 
Spain  32.70 40.34 33.22 41.88 34.23 45.27 34.72 45.99 
Sweden  30.09 47.27 31.10 53.54 35.68 33.90 36.42 35.61 
Switzerland  69.41 75.25 73.85 85.13 25.11 27.91 25.28 28.01 
United Kingdom  35.75 45.04 36.16 46.15 53.67 60.75 55.28 61.42 
United States  27.74 30.38 27.80 30.42 65.11 82.48 66.03 85.61 
Unweighted mean  38.32 45.03 39.57 47.17 39.41 43.87 40.51 46.21 
Standard deviation  0.12 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.14 
Coefficient of 
variation  0.31 0.39 0.33 0.40 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.30 
 
 
U.S. become much more integrated. In contrast, some small countries such as Switzerland 
show a reversed pattern, as to be expected. 
Figures 4 and 5 provide graphical counterparts to table 5. In both cases (for outDFI  
and inDFI ) the pattern is increasing, especially under outDFI . The violin plots contained in 
the lower panels also show relevant patterns, suggesting disparity is increasing, especially 
for outDFI . Therefore, although the world is more financially integrated today than eight 
years ago, the involvement of the different countries is unequal, and these inequalities are 
becoming more apparent over time. 
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Figure 4. Degree of financial integration (DFI), outflows, 1999-2006 
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The relative contributions of both DFO  and DRTFC  to the international economic 
integration are shown in figure 6. As suggested earlier, the contributions are unequal, 
representing the degree of regularity of the total financial connections the largest share. 
However, the contribution of each component follows an opposite pattern. That is, whereas 
the contribution of openness to international financial integration is increasing, the 
contribution of the degree of regularity of the total financial connections is declining. 
Therefore, the picture emerging is of a multiplicity of ways through which countries 
attain their levels of international financial integration. Both openness and balance in the 
volume  and  direction  of  cross-border flows are relevant, and their relevance has different
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Figure 5. Degree of financial integration (DFI), inflows, 1999-2006 
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angles. Whereas openness generates marked differences between countries, the degree of 
regularity of the total financial flows is more homogeneous, and higher. However, this 
indicator also shows differences across countries and over time, suggesting a geographical 
bias exists for the bilateral asset trading, as documented by previous literature. In addition, 
both home and foreign banks contribute differently to the integration level of each country, 
the extreme and opposite cases being represented by Switzerland and the U.S. 
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Figure 6. Evolution of /i iDFO DFI  vs. /i iDRTFC DFI , country-specific γ 
(means), 1999-2006 
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4.4. Global indicators 
The previous sections have focused mainly on the individual analysis of the three 
indicators, as well as providing some summary statistics. One of the summary statistics 
provided was the weighted mean, which was computed for all three indicators, considering 
the role of indirect links, and also taking into account the direction of the cross-border 
flows. This result is relevant, since it indicates the gap between the current level of 
international financial integration and its theoretical full potential, the latter defined by the 
SPFI. 
Given this importance, which is one of the most important goals of the study, we 
report this information explicitly in table 6, where we provide information on all global 
indicators and consider the weight of the total bank assets in each country. These indicators 
have been computed following expressions (13), (10) and (11) for the degree of global 
financial integration, the degree of global financial openness, and the degree of regularity 
of the total financial connections. Results indicate that, regardless of the direction of the 
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asset flows, the level of global integration attained as of 2006 is quite similar in terms of 
outflows or inflows. Figures range between 46.9% and 49.5%, depending on whether 
indirect links are considered, or the direction of the flows. Therefore, although the pace is 
rapid (by 1999, the DGFI  was mostly below 40%), we are still not halfway to the 
theoretical full potential of international financial integration —i.e., to the Standard of 
Perfect Financial Integration. The increase in DGI  has been mostly driven by the increase 
in the degree of global financial openness, whose advance has been proportionally higher. 
In contrast, the contribution of the DRTFC  has even been small for outDRTFC  and 
negative for inDRTFC , although this finding was partly to be expected because the values 
of DRTFC  were already high by 1999. 
Table 6. Global degrees ( DGO , DGDC , DGTC , DGI ), 1999--2006 (%) 
 
Outflows Inflows 
DGTC  DGI  DGTC  DGI  Year 
DGO  
1=γ  iγγ =  1=γ  iγγ =  DGO  1=γ  iγγ =  1=γ  iγγ =  
1999 20.85 78.23 80.15 38.95 39.55 21.13 83.32 85.38 39.58 40.19 
2000 23.22 80.44 82.67 41.69 42.41 23.84 85.63 88.04 42.57 43.31 
2001 24.84 81.50 84.16 42.86 43.76 25.79 84.34 87.15 43.88 44.80 
2002 25.18 81.03 84.20 42.72 43.80 26.41 81.42 84.30 43.87 44.81 
2003 24.99 80.17 83.22 42.43 43.47 25.81 81.45 84.27 43.36 44.29 
2004 27.71 78.41 81.91 44.37 45.62 28.65 80.40 83.78 45.41 46.62 
2005 28.78 79.88 83.33 45.41 46.67 30.48 80.25 83.52 46.64 47.83 
2006 30.61 79.20 82.84 46.89 48.21 32.15 81.55 84.82 48.35 49.53 
 
 
5. On the relative positions between bank flows' directions 
In the previous section it has become apparent that the direction of cross-border 
financial flows is crucial in assessing each country's degree of financial integration. The 
extreme cases are represented by Switzerland and the U.S., whose DFO  shows opposite 
patterns when evaluating them through either inflows or outflows. 
The aim of this section is to show visually this type of evidence for all countries in 
the sample. The information provided is decomposed into two figures. First, figure 7 
provides information on the relative positions for each country, for DFO  (first row in the 
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figure), DDC  (second row), and DFI  (bottom row), and also for 1999 (first column), 2006 
(second column) and all sample years (pooled, third column). Second, figure 8 displays 
how countries have transited from their positions in 1999 to those as of 2006. 
As shown by the first row sub-figures in figure 7, some countries show opposite 
behaviors which, in addition, are getting more extreme over time. Those countries above 
the 45-degree diagonal are more open regarding their inflows, whereas those below that 
diagonal are more financially open on the outflows side. The general tendency is to deepen, 
or at least to remain, in their preferred orientation Those countries below the 45-degree 
diagonal tend to shift rightwards when comparing 1999 and 2006 (i.e., their outiDFO  
increases), whereas those above the main diagonal tend to shift upwards (i.e., their iniDFO  
increases). Therefore, it seems there is a tendency towards ``specialization within increased 
financial integration''. That is, although countries become, in general, more financially 
open, the enhanced openness does not generally occur both via inflows and outflows 
simultaneously but rather countries focus increasingly on their relative specializations. 
When evaluating the sample years altogether, these tendencies become even more apparent, 
since observations tend to scatter in both two directions. 
The second row in figure 7 presents analogous information for the DRDFC 15. In 
this case, the tendency for most countries is to shift in both possible directions —i.e., both 
cross-border inflows and outflows are much more balanced by 2006 that they were by 
1999. However, some notable exceptions exist such as Denmark and Sweden —two of the 
non euro-area European countries in our sample— together with one of their most 
important economic and financial partner —i.e., Finland. These three countries show an 
opposite behavior with respect to that by countries which have joined the euro. While the 
flows of euro-area countries are now slightly more balanced, the Nordic countries in our 
sample perform more poorly in this respect. This behavior could not only be related to their 
traditionally strong links, but also to the openness of some Eastern European countries such 
as the Baltic republics or Russia, which are not included in our sample.
                                        
 
15 We do not provide information on indirect cross-border flows, in order to save space. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 7. Relative positions between inflows and outflows, DFO, DRDFC and DFI 
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Figure 8 provides information as to how countries' have evolved in the indicators 
under analysis —i.e., it is the graphic counterpart to tables 2, 3 and 5. The general tendency 
has been to move upwards, for both flows' directions, and for the degree of financial 
openness and the degree of financial integration. However, as mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, not only has the DRDFC  remained rather stagnant but it has decreased for 
some specific countries, as shown by several countries below the 45-degree line —
especially for cross-border inflows. As a final result, although financial integration is 
affecting most countries worldwide, some of them have participated less intensively in this 
process (when comparing 1999 vs. 2006), namely, Italy (outflows), Sweden (inflows) and 
Finland (inflows and outflows). 
6. Concluding remarks 
The aim of the article has been to develop new indicators of the degree of 
international financial integration along with its determinants, taking into account not only 
financial openness but also the regularity in the network of bilateral cross-border flows. The 
contribution of the study consists of defining a Standard of Perfect Financial Integration 
(SPFI) for characterizing the scenario in which the links between financial systems were 
established as if they made up a “global financial village”. In such a case, cross-border 
financial flows would not show geographical bias, and home bias should also vanish for 
international financial flows. They should only hinge on the relative size of the financial 
system, as would be the case for a gravity model in which distance were irrelevant. 
After revising the related literature, section 2 established the properties for 
characterizing the concept of geographic neutrality, and defined the indicators of degree of 
financial openness, degree of regularity of direct financial connections (both direct and 
indirect), and degree of financial integration, for each country and for the world economy. 
For all of them we set precise intervals, ranging between [0,1]. Compared with the 
corresponding benchmark to a scenario of geographic neutrality, it is possible to assess the 
degree of financial integration achieved, and assess the relative contributions of each of its 
determinants. 
In comparison with previous measures proposed by the literature, our indicators 
have some interesting features. First, we consider a network approach in which not only 
financial openness is relevant but also where we can describe the direction and intensity of
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Figure 8. Relative positions between 1999 and 2006, DFO, DRDFC and DFI 
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financial connections. This distinction is relevant, since the distinguishing between 
financial openness and financial integration has been an issue not sufficiently stressed by 
the literature. Second, although our measures are quantity-based, they have an interesting 
feature which so far has been virtually confined to price-based indicators, namely, we set a 
benchmark —the Standard of Perfect Financial Integration (SPFI)— describing the 
theoretical full potential of economies in terms of financial integration. Accordingly, we 
can measure the gap between the current level of integration and that level achievable 
should perfect financial integration exist. As we may easily infer, the SPFI constitutes the 
quantity-based counterpart to the LOOP, according to which the prices for the products in 
question would be the same irrespective of the geographical domicile of the seller or the 
buyer of the product. As suggested by some authors cabral.dierick.vesala.ecb2002, this law 
is especially difficult to hold in the banking field due to the lack of data. 
The empirical application performed in the second half of the study analyzes the 
banking integration for 18 countries, accounting for the 83% of international banking 
markets over the 1999-2006 period. According to the results obtained, the degree of 
financial integration advances rapidly, and has increased from 40% to 50% over the eight 
years analyzed. However, we are barely halfway to the theoretical full potential of complete 
international financial integration. The level of financial globalization achieved is the result 
of a moderate openness (around 30%) yet strongly increasing (it has increased by 50% in 
eight years time), and a network of bilateral bank flows which attains a high level of 
regularity (close to 80%, on average), which is slightly reinforced by factoring indirect 
connections, but is quite stable over time. 
Therefore, we might conclude that the highest barrier for financial integration is that 
separating each specific banking system from the exterior (i.e., the border effect), setting 
limits for the degrees of financial openness. However, this barrier, along with the home bias 
(which is still high), is losing relevance slowly. Once financial flows have crossed borders, 
they follow a variety of different directions with no special preferences —i.e., geographical 
bias is not too high on average. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that although our 
sample is highly representative in terms of total foreign claims of the world banking 
system, it is only made up of matrices of bilateral financial flows for a limited number of 
countries which, because of their level of financial development may contribute to 
geographic neutrality. 
However, results vary markedly from country to country, and differences tend to 
increase over time, as shown by the violin plots corresponding to all three indicators. In 
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addition, the levels corresponding to each banking system indicators tend to differ strongly 
when assessed from either the perspective of foreign assets or liabilities. Ideally, the study 
should be extended to developing countries in order to corroborate the findings by some 
authors such as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), according to whom financial integration 
advances rapidly among advanced economies, whereas trade integration advances more 
rapidly among emerging economies. Unfortunately, the available data (which requires data 
on both foreign assets and liabilities for each trading country pair) sets a limit difficult to 
cross. 
In contrast to what one might sometimes find in the literature, higher (lower) sizes 
do not explain lower (higher) degrees of financial openness. In the case of bank foreign 
assets, we may find a myriad of examples including small countries which are either very 
open (Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland) or very closed (Greece, Austria, Portugal). In 
addition, some countries' behavior reverses when reversing the direction of the financial 
flow. This is the case of the U.S. (Switzerland), which is very closed (open) when 
considering bank foreign assets, but very open (closed) when considering liabilities. 
Regarding the regularity of connections, some countries excel because of the higher 
geographical bias of their cross-border bank flows. This is the case of Canada and the 
Nordic countries in the sample —for both bank foreign assets and liabilities. In the 
Canadian case, a likely explanation could be derived from the strong ties with the U.S. 
(despite the relevance of the border effect; see McCallum, 1995), whereas the geographical 
bias affecting Nordic countries might be explained by the intensity of the flows between 
them. While one must look directly at the data to corroborate these facts, the degree of 
regularity provides us with an index containing this type of information. Another 
interesting case is represented by Ireland, whose degree of regularity has increased sharply 
from 1999 to 2006 because both the U.K. and the U.S. now account for lower volumes of 
foreign claims, whereas euro-area countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and France) have 
gained importance. In other words, Ireland's cross-border flows are now more balanced, 
contributing positively to its international financial integration. 
The interpretation of the determinants of the differences between countries in their 
degrees of openness and regularity calls for a deeper analysis following the research lines 
suggested here, in order to delve into the likely causes of the failure to meet the geographic 
neutrality criterion. One of the hypothesis to be tested relates to distance (either 
geographical, cultural, political, or informational), which still matters as suggested by 
gravity models recently developed to interpret cross-border asset flows. However, the 
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asymmetries detected for the degrees of openness and regularity when shifting the 
perspective from bank foreign assets to liabilities indicate that integration levels vary a 
great deal depending on the adopted perspective. This event might suggest that the 
distances between banking systems do not offer satisfactory explanations for the different 
integration levels achieved, given that the causes would be the same while the effects 
would vary depending on the perspective adopted. In relation to this, the network analysis 
literature distinguishes between symmetric and asymmetric networks. Financial 
connections would fall into the latter category, because the direction of flows matters when 
assessing financial integration, as indicated by Rodrik (1999) when referring to the 
relevance of looking not only at exports but also at imports when analyzing international 
trade integration. 
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